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INTRODUCTION

In this Essay, I continue my previous analysis of the first sale rule (or princivle of
exhaustion) in intellectual property law in the context of international trade.
In
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; Visiting Professor, Faculty
of Law, National
University of Singapore. This Essay has benefitted from comments and conversations with many
colleagues. In particular, I thank Margaret Chon, John Cross, Christine Haight Farley, Eric Goldman, Leah
Chan Grinvald, Paul Heald, Steven Hetcher, Mary LaFrance, Marshall Leaffer, Edward Lee, Jacqueline
Lipton, Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse, Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Elisabeth Ng Siew Kuan, Burton Ong, Lisa Ramsey,
Mary Wong, and Peter Yu. I also thank Heather Stutz for research assistance. This Essay summarizes my
preliminary considerations on this topic and draws from research on a larger project on parallel imports and
misuse of intellectual property rights that I will continue over the next year. A follow up Chapter on the
*

issues addressed in this Essay will also be published in DISTRIBUTION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,

Thdmis, forthcoming 2014 (Pierre-Emanuel Moyse ed.). The views expressed in this Essay, and any
mistakes, remain my own.
1In previous works I have analyzed, in details, the first sale rule in trademark and copyright law. In this
Essay , I compare the two different rules in light of the current development in the case law in the United
States. See, e.g., Irene Calboli, An American Tale: The UnclearApplication of the FirstSale Rule in United
States Copyright Law (andIts Impact on InternationalTrade), in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE

CROSSROADS OF TRADE 67 (Jan Rosen ed., 2013) [hereinafter Calboli, FirstSale in Copyright Law]; Irene
Calboli, Market Integrationand (the Limits of) the FirstSale Rule in North American and European
TrademarkLaw, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2011) [hereinafter Calboli, FirstSale Rule in Trademark
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particular, I highlight the differences between the first sale rules in trademark and
copyright law-in particular, international first sale in trademark law and national first
sale (at least to date) in copyright law-and criticize the corporate trend to invoke
copyright protection for incidental product features of otherwise functional and
uncopyrightable products in order to restrict the importation of gray market (genuine)
products into the United States. During the past decade, corporations have increasingly
turned to copyright law to protect the designs used in their labels, logos, products
packaging, and so forth.2 However, I elaborate in this Essay that this trend is frequently
finalized at leveraging the copyright protection on these designs to encompass the entire
products to which these designs are affixed, and in turn circumvent the rule of trademark
law (international first sale) by blocking the importation of gray market products under
the more business-friendly rule of national copyright first sale.
Hence, I argue in this Essay that this opportunistic exploitation of copyright
protection in the context of the international trade of consumer products directly
undermines the policy objectives both of copyright and trademark law.3 Copyright and
trademark law generally follow different rules-for the acquisition, enforcement, and
limitation of the exclusive rights that are granted under their respective regimes-and
find their justification in different policy objectives. Copyright protection stems from the
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the authority "to
promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 4
In contrast, trademark law derives its authority from the Commerce Clause and trademark
protection focuses primarily on guaranteeing fairness in competition by preventing
consumer confusion and by protecting the goodwill established by a mark in the
marketplace. 5 Accordingly, claims of copyright protection for incidental product features
of otherwise functional products inevitably distort the traditional objectives of both
copyright and trademark protection. Ultimately, these claims aim primarily at leveraging
copyright protection to control product distribution in the international market. In this
Essay I advocate, in particular, that these claims are an opportunistic exploitation of
copyright protection, and that the courts should expressly define and prohibit these claims
as a type of copyright misuse.6
Law]; Irene Calboli, TrademarkExhaustion in the European Union: Community-Wide or International?
The Saga Continues, 6 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 47 (2002).
2 For a description (and different positions) on this practice, see
Teresa Scassa, Using Copyright to
Prevent ParallelImportation:A Comment on Kraft Canada,Inc. v. Euro Excellence, 85 CAN. BAR REV.
409, 410 (2006) (critically advocating against the practice of using copyright protection to prevent the

importation of otherwise legitimate gray market products). Professor Scassa quotes Wee W. Webster,
Restrainingthe Gray Marketer: Policy and Practice,4 C.I.P.R. 211, 225 (1988) (supporting the same
practice). Id. at 410, n.4. For an early analysis of this practice, see also Donna K. Hintz, Battling Gray
Market Goods With Copyright Law, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1212-13 (1994) (underscoring the difficulties in
interpreting the first sale rule provisions in the Copyright Act and advocating for a legislative amendment
clarifying that copyright owners can prevent the importation of copyrighted gray market products).
3 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997) (highlighting the
"public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.").
4 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-96 (1879); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265,265-66 (1987) ("Trademark law ... can
be best explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency.").
6 Generally, on the doctrine of copyright misuse, see Assessment
Tech. of Wisconsin, L.L.C. v.
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The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. In Part II, I provide a brief
overview of the differences between the first sale rules in trademark and copyright law.
In Part III, I criticize the growing practice of corporations leveraging copyright protection
for incidental features of otherwise uncopyrightable products in order to invoke the
principle of national first sale in copyright law for products in their entirety to prevent the
importation of gray market products. In particular, I argue that this practice amounts to
copyright misuse, as it has been recently recognized by part of the judiciary, and I call
upon the courts to consistently embrace this line of reasoning and curtail this misuse of
copyright protection by corporations. In Part IV, I evaluate the possible outcomes of
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,7 which is currently pending in the Supreme Court on the
territorial extent of the copyright first sale rule, and Omega v. Costco Wholesale, which
is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit on the issue of gray market products and
copyright misuse. I specifically advocate that the Ninth Circuit finds that Omega
misused copyright law when it claimed copyright protection for a small design engraved
on the back of its watches to prevent the unauthorized importation of these watches into
the United States. In this part, I also call upon Congress to consider a legislative
amendment to the text of the Copyright Act to formally prohibit the leveraging of
copyright protection for incidental product features in the context of international trade,
following the examples of other common law jurisdictions. Still, I conclude, in the
immediate future the responsibility remains with the courts-the Ninth Circuit in first
instance-to prevent corporations from opportunistically exploiting overlapping
copyrights and trademarks and blocking, in turn, the importation of legitimate gray
market products to the detriment of consumers, market competition, and the general
equilibrium of the intellectual property system.
II. THE (STILL DIFFERENT) FIRST SALE RULES IN TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW
c

t

Traditionally, intellectual property first sale rules developed as judicial doctrines or
originated as statutory provisions to balance the exclusive rights granted to businesses,
inventors, and creators in their products and works, with the rights of retailers,
consumers, and second-hand dealers to freely resell or dispose of these products and
works after having lawfully acquired them in the market. 9 However, intellectual property
owners frequently attempt to bypass these rules-with contractual provisions or
otherwise-as these rules directly limit their ability to control product distribution (and

Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003); Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir.
1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc.
v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). In 2011, the District Court for the Eastern District of California
ruled that Omega's attempt to leverage copyright protection on an insignia engraved on the back of
Omegas' watches was copyright misuse. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 155893 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9. 2011). In this Essay, I specifically advocate that the Ninth Circuit affirm
the decision of the lower count in this case. See infra Part IV.
7 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,132 S. Ct. 1905,
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697).
8 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. July 25, 2012).
9 See, e.g., Calboli, FirstSale Rule in Trademark Law, supranote 1, at 1250-51 (tracing the origin of the

first sale rule in trademark law); Calboli, FirstSale Rule in Copyright Law, supra note 1, at 71-72 (tracing
the origin of the first sale rule in copyright law); see also John A. Rothchild, ExhaustingExtraterritoriality,
51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1187, 1187-88 (2011).
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pricing strategies) in the aftermarket.' 0 In particular, strong disputes have defined the
application of first sale rules in the context of international trade. Intellectual property
owners generally engage in different pricing strategies across countries based on the
circumstances of each country (competition in the national market, average income, and
so forth). As a result, they oppose the international arbitrage of their products (usually
from low-cost to high-cost countries) by gray marketers (unauthorized importers).
National governments, in turn, follow different positions on the issue-permitting or
blocking the importation of gray market products-based on the economic and public
policy interests of the specific jurisdictions.12 Developed countries usually tend to oppose
the importation of gray market products into their countries while developing countries
generally favor it. 13
Precisely because of the diverging national interests among the various members on
the World Trade Organization (WTO), Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)14 states that nothing in the Agreement
can "be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."' 5
Lacking a common international standard, WTO members' approaches to first sale rules
thus follow one of three systems, which may also vary depending on the subject matter at
issue (patents, trademarks, and copyright).' 6 First, under national first sale (or national
exhaustion), national rights are exhausted only after the products have been distributed
for sale in the national market, and intellectual property owners can oppose gray market
products from outside the national market. Second, under international first sale (or
internationalexhaustion), national rights are exhausted regardless of where the products
have been distributed for sale in the world, and intellectual property owners cannot
prevent gray market products in the national market. Third, under regionalfirst sale (or
regional exhaustion), national rights are exhausted after the products have been
distributed for sale in a specific region (like the European Union) and intellectual

10

The corporate opposition to gray market products is well summarized in the position adopted by the

International Trademark Association (INTA) in 2007. See PositionPaper on ParallelImports INT'L
TRADEMARK ASS'N (July 2007), availableat
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAParallellmports2007.pdf.
1 The academic literature in this area is extensive. See, e.g. Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibitionof
ParallelImports Through Intellectual PropertyRights, 30 INT' L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
[IIC] 495 (1999) (Ger.); Christopher Heath, ParallelImports and InternationalTrade, 28 IIC 623 (1997)
(Ger.); Herman Cohen Jehoram, InternationalExhaustion versus ImportationRight: A Murky Area of
IntellectualProperty Law, 4 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER
TElL [GRUIT.] 280 (1996) (Ger.).
12 See Jerome H. Reichman, IntellectualProperty in InternationalTrade: Opportunities and Risks of a
GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 769-96 (1989); Frederick M. Abbott, Parallel
Importation: Economic and Social Welfare Dimensions, INT'L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., 5 (June
2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/parallel importation.pdf; see also Vincent Chiappetta, The
Desirability ofAgreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, InternationalIPR Exhaustion, and a Few Other
Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333 (2000).
13 See S.K. Verma, Exhaustion ofIntellectual PropertyRights and Free Trade-Article 6 ofthe TRIPS
Agreements, 29 IIC 534, 536 (1998) (Ger.).
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 LL M. 83 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS].
15 Id. art. 6. See Verma, supra note 13 at 539.
16 For a detailed explanation of the different approaches on intellectual property first sale rules, see
Calboli, FirstSale Rule in TrademarkLaw, supra note 1, at 1250-51.
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property owners cannot oppose the further circulation of the products within that region.
However, owners can oppose gray market products from outside the region.
Similar

to other developed countries, the United

States follows

a system of

national

7

first sale with respect to patent law and patented products.1 However, the United States
follows a system of international first sale with respect to trademark law and trademarked
products, while its position with respect to copyright first sale is less clear. Courts and
scholars disagree over whether the Copyright Act establishes a system of national or
international first sale, even though the majority of the courts have favored an
interpretation of the statute as establishing a system of national first sale.' 8
The United States' position on trademark first sale derives from the traditional
premise that trademarks are not protected as property per se, but exclusively as indicators
of commercial origin and symbols of business goodwill. Based on this premise, the
importation of gray market goods is allowed as long as consumers are not confused as to
the origin and quality of the marked products. 19 The public policy objective of this rule
rests on the position that the public should be allowed to benefit from the lower prices
and increased competition resulting from non-confusing gray market products, and
trademark owners should not rely on trademark rights to partition the international market
(despite the profit losses that this may entail for trademark owners).2 0 In particular,
trademark law permits the importation of gray market goods when "both the foreign and
the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same person or business entity." 21 To
avoid strategic assignments between affiliated companies to circumvent this rule, the
concept of "same ownership" includes "parent and subsidiary companies or [companies]
otherwise subject to common ownership or control." 22 As an exception to this general
rule, trademark owners can block gray market products when these products, despite
being genuine and first offered for sale by the same trademark owners abroad, are
"materially different" from the goods that trademark owners are selling in the domestic
market. 2 3 This exception was originally developed in the Lever Brothers cases24 and is

17

Even though the Patent Act does not explicitly limit the first sale rule to national sale, courts have

consistently found that international sale does not exhaust patent rights. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz
Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that "[t]he patentee's authorization of an
international first sale does not affect exhaustion of that patentee's rights in the United States" and that
"foreign sales can never occur under a United States patent because the United States patent system does
not provide for extraterritorial effect."). This Essay does not address a detailed analysis of the United
States' approach to the first sale rule in patent law.
1 See generally Calboli, FirstSale Rule in Copyright Law, supra note 1, at 71-73 (highlighting the
current disputes over the territorial extent of the application of section 109(a) of the Copyright Act).
19 The U.S. Tariff Act prohibits the importation of a product that "bears a trademark owned by a citizen
of... the United States and is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office." See Tariff Act of 1930,
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006). The Lanham Act bars the importation of goods with a mark that will "copy or
simulate" a registered trademark. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2006).
2o See, e.g., Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1995)
(underscoring that "the consumer gets exactly what the consumer bargains for, the genuine product of the
particular producer").
21 KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 289 (1988).
22 Id. at 288 (indicating that the protection afforded by the Tariff Act 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) is
exclusively
for 23
domestic U.S. trademark owners that have no corporate affiliation with the foreign manufacturer).
See J. Thomas McCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 10, § 29:5051.75.
24 Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (the court stated
that when a mark is
applied to physically different goods, the mark is not "genuine" and the affiliation between the producers
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based upon the consideration that consumers could be confused as to the actual quality of
the marked products if two products with identical appearance are sold in the United
States under the same marks but are of different quality. Still, under the revised Customs
Service Regulations, gray marketers can lawfully import materially different products
into the national territory as long as they properly label the products to alert consumers
about their different quality. 25 The policy behind the Customs Service Regulations'
limitation to the Lever Brother rule rests again on the fact that, as long as consumers are
not confused as a result of the different quality of products, consumers should benefit
from the lower prices and the increased competition that gray market products may bring
into the United States market.
Conversely, the United States' position with respect to the first sale rule in
copyright law is unsettled and clarification is currently awaited from the Supreme Court's
decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons.26 Originally, the first sale rule was first
developed by the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,2 7 and was later codified in
the 1909 Copyright Act, under which "the exclusive right to 'vend' was limited to the
first sales of the work." 2 8 The 1976 Copyright Act confirmed the first sale rule in section
109(a), which states that the owners of copyrighted works "lawfully made under this
title" are entitled "to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that [work]" without
the "authority of the copyright owner." 29 However, Congress did not clarify the
territorial extent of section 109(a). Still, the majority of the courts (and copyright
owners) generally supported the view that section 109(a) applies only to domestic and not
international sale. 30 Courts derived this position from the combined interpretation of
section 109(a) and section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which provides that the
"[i]mportation into the United States" of a copyrighted work acquired outside the United
States "without the authority of the [copyright] owner" is "an infringement of the
exclusive right [of] distribut[ion]." 3 1 Only a minority of courts, most notably the Third
Circuit, agreed that section 109(a) limits the importation right in section 602(a)(1) and
does not reduce the resulting likelihood of consumer confusion.); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877
F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Socidt6 Des Produits Nestl6, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
639 (1st Cir. 1992).
25 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b) (2012) ("Goods determined by the Customs Service to be physically and
materially different ... shall not be detained ... where the merchandise or its packaging bears a

conspicuous and legible label . . ." that indicates that "[tihis product is not a product authorized by the

United States trademark owner for importation and is physically and materially different from the
authorized products."); see also Mark S. Sommers & Louis J. Levy, US Customs Amends Gray Market
Import Rule, 117 TRADEMARK WORLD 32, 33 (1999).
26

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1905,

(U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697).
27 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
28 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 141-42 (1998) ("Congress
subsequently codified our holding in Bobbs-Merrill that the exclusive right to 'vend' was limited to first

sales of the work.").

The Copyright Act, 17 USC § 109(a) (2008).
See, e.g., Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996); Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318
(9th Cir. 1991).
29
30

The Copyright Act, 17 USC § 602(a)(1) (2008). Since section 602(1)(a) was introduced in the
Copyright Act, the majority of the courts interpreted the provision as intending to bar the unauthorized
31

importation of copyrighted products even when the products had been lawfully been made and first

distributed abroad under the authorization of copyright owners. See e.g. Parfums Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481.
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equally applies to national and international sales. 32 Nonetheless, the majoritarian
position on the issue may change soon as a result of the certiorari pending in front of the
Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng.33
Not surprisingly, after the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, the business world
(and intellectual property lawyers) realized that, compared to the international first sale
rule in trademark law, the rule on national copyright first sale could provide corporations
with assistance in their fight against gray market products. 3 4 Corporations thus started to
seek copyright protection for their consumer products. However, since consumer
products are frequently functional and accordingly uncopyrightable, corporations
strategically claimed copyright protection for other (nonfunctional) parts of their
products. This practice resulted in copyright registrations for incidental product
features-labels, decorations on packaging, and so forth-as these incidental elements
could fit more easily under the scope of copyright protection. 3 5 Corporations then relied
on the copyright protection for these features to control the circulation of the entire
products carrying the incidental copyrighted feature. In particular, corporations started to
invoke section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act and claimed copyright infringement
against the importation of gray market goods, which carried those copyrighted product
features. 36 However, once litigation was brought forth, importers and distributors
accused of copyright infringement challenged the conventional interpretation that the
combined language of sections 109(a) and 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act supported a
system of national first sale allowing corporations to segment international markets.
Instead, importers and distributors argued that in the absence of specific guidance in the
Copyright Act, section 109(a) limits section 602(1)(a) and equally applies to products
first sold nationally and internationally. 3 7 In other words, the provision could not be used
to prevent the importation of gray market products.
In the late 1990s, in Quality King v. L'anza,3 8 a case involving gray market hair
care products and a claim of copyright infringement in the products' labels and
instructions, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue for the first time. The Court's ruling
did not clarify, but rather complicated the issue. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of
the distributor and found that copyright in the products had been exhausted, yet it reached
32

See, e.g., Sebastian Int'l Inc. v Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988)

(stressing that if section 109(a) applied only to copies sold in the U.S.; copyright owners selling copies
abroad would receive a purchase price and a right to limit importation, whereas copyright owners selling
copies domestically would only receive the purchase price).
3 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,132 S. Ct. 1905,
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697)
34
See Willie Skinner, Note, PreventingGray Markets: Is CopyrightLaw the Answer?, 26 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 315, 328 (1999).
3 Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "useful article" as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information." 17 USC § 101
(2008). "An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article'." Id. See also
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140,
1146-47 (9th Cir. 2003); Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d
488, 493 (4th Cir. 1996); Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (2d Cir.
1987).
36
See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008); L'anza Research
Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs. Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996).
37
See, e.g., SebastianInt'l. 847 F.2d 1093.
38 Quality King Distribs. Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135 (1998).
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this conclusion only because the products had been made and first sold in the United
States, then exported abroad, and eventually re-imported into the United States (the so
called "round-trip").39 Still, the Court did not take a position on whether section 109(a)
could be applied to all gray market products which had been made and first distributed
with the authorization of copyright owners.40 Absent such important clarification, the
decision seemed to confirm the previous majoritarian position that the United States
follows a system of national copyright first sale, especially with respect to products first
distributed abroad. Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority precisely on this
premise.41 More problematically, she stated that "lawfully made under this title" meant
"lawfully made in the United States," 42 thus (maybe unintentionally) suggesting that
section 109(a) would not apply to foreign manufactured goods even after these goods
have been distributed in the United States under the authority of the copyright owners.
Not surprisingly, additional litigation followed after Quality King. In 2010, the Supreme
Court again granted certiorari in Costco v. Omega,43 a case involving gray market
watches carrying a copyrighted (minuscule) insignia. This time the products had been
made and first distributed in Europe and were later imported into the United States. The
Court's decision was again disappointing. The Justices equally divided and in a nineword per curiam decision, 44 affinned the decision of the Ninth Circuit in favor of Omega,
where the Ninth Circuit supported the interpretation that section 109(a) only applies after
the products have been distributed in the United States. 4 5 Clearly aware of the pressing
need to finally resolve the growing ambiguities in this area, the Supreme Court again
granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons in April 2012. 46 This case
concerned gray market books (not incidental product features) and a decision on the case
is awaited in the near future. As I elaborate in Part IV, this decision will prove crucial to
clarify the territorial extent of the first sale rule in copyright law, and could possibly end
the corporate game of leveraging copyright protection for incidental product features to
circumvent the international first sale in trademark law.

' Id. at 139, 153-54.
40 See generally Calboli, FirstSale Rule in Copyright Law, supranote 1, at
79 (summarizing the
decision and highlighting that the "Supreme Court's decision fell short of addressing the territorial extent of
the first sale rule in copyright law").
41 See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Justice Ginsburg
underscored that she
was only joining the majority in recognizing that the decision was not resolving "cases in which the
allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad.").
42 Id. (Ginsburg J., concurring) (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 166-70
(1997 SuPP.) and 10 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 16.0, 16:1-16:2 (2d ed. 1998)).
43 Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A. 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (Justice Kagan recused herself due to

her previous role as solicitor general).
44 Id.
45 See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481(9th Cir. 1994) and Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys
"R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Samuel Brooks, Note, Battling Gray Markets
Through Copyright Law: Omega SA v. Costco Wholesale Corporation,2010 BYU L. REv. 19 (2010).
46
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1905,
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697).
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III. LEVERAGING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR INCIDENTAL PRODUCT FEATURES TO
PREVENT THE IMPORTATION OF GRAY MARKET PRODUCTS: LEGITIMATE GAME OR
COPYRIGHT MISUSE?

The exploitation of one type of intellectual property right to expand rights under
other types of rights is not a new phenomenon in the business world. Intellectual
property owners frequently attempt to exploit overlapping intellectual property rights: for
example, overlapping patent and trademark protection, or patent and copyright
protection. Hence, courts have generally rejected this practice as a breach in the political
equilibrium of the intellectual property system. 4 7 However, courts have not sufficiently
addressed to date-or have confusingly addressed-the problems arising from the
exploitation of copyright protection in the context of the international trade of
commercial products and intellectual property first sale rules. To a certain extent, courts
have directly avoided entering the debate on this issue, which is certainly a difficult issue,
but is one that ought to be resolved. For example, even though the Supreme Court
noticed in Quality King that the case was "unusual" insofar as it concerned "the integrity
of ... methods of marketing" 48 for shampoos rather than more traditional copyrighted
works, the Court steered away from addressing the fact that L'anza was leveraging
copyright protection for incidental product features-the product labels-to prevent the
importation of the entire shampoo bottles. 49 Furthermore, in its non-decision in Costco
the Court did not address the fact that Omega had affixed a minuscule insignia to its
watches as an exclusive measure to block gray market watches. 50 Similarly, the lower
courts that have decided cases in this respect have never questioned plaintiffs about the
legitimacy of applying copyright protection to questionable "works," nor have they
challenged plaintiffs' strategies of using copyright protection to control international
product distribution.5 Appropriate judicial guidance is thus urgently needed, and the
time has come for the judiciary to step into this debate and properly address the
boundaries between copyright and trademark protection in the context of international
trade.
As I highlighted in the Introduction, the public policy objectives that justify
copyright and trademark protection in the United States (and elsewhere) hinge on two
separate concepts that do not overlap in purpose-and as a result copyright and
trademark law follow different rules on requirements, duration, infringement, and
limitations and exceptions. Copyright law protects works of authorship to reward authors
and enrich society with their work. However, the works belong to the public domain once
the copyright has expired.5 2 In contrast, trademark law protects distinctive signs that are
used in the course of trade to signal commercial origin, sponsorship, or affiliation, but

47

See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141(1989); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 105 (1880).
48 Quality King Distribs, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140 (1998).
49
See id. .
50
See Costco Wholesale Corp. v Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
51 For example, the Ninth Circuit did not raise this issue when it decided the same
cases that were later
decided by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir.
2008);
52 L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs. Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996).
See discussion supra Introduction and Part II.
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only within the limits of consumer confusion and misappropriation of business
goodwill.53 Accordingly, copyright law does not authorize businesses to use to copyright
norms to circumvent trademark law and control the international distribution and further
circulation of genuine uncopyrightable products against the rule of international
trademark first sale. Moreover, copyright law does not authorize businesses to invoke
copyright protection for incidental features (decorations of the product packaging, labels,
product instructions or warranty terms, and so forth) of products that are uncopyrightable
because they constitute useful articles, 54 especially when businesses leverage this
protection to protect the entire product. As recently ruled also by the District Court for
the Eastern District of California in Omega v. Costco in the remand of the case following
the Supreme Court's non-decision in Costco v. Omega, this practice should not be
permitted as it clearly represents an anomaly within the intellectual property system.
Instead, this practice should be explicitly prohibited as a misuse of copyright law and
policy.
United States courts developed the doctrine of copyright misuse as an equitable
defense against abusive claims of copyright infringement in the 1990s. 5 This doctrine is
modeled primarily after the doctrine of patent misuse, which traces back to the 1942
Supreme Court decision in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger.56 In this case, the Court
found that patent holders misused their patent rights by engaging in overreaching "tying"
practices while selling their patented products. The Court held that such overextension of
exclusive rights should not be permitted and should result in rendering patent rights
unenforceable until the misuses had ceased, including withholding remedies for patent
infringement or breach of a license agreement involving the patent.5 7 However, it was
not until 1990, almost fifty years after Morton Salt, that the doctrine of misuse was
successfully invoked in the area of copyright law by an alleged copyright infringer in
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds.ss In this case, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
defendant that the plaintiff had misused its copyright when it forbade defendant from
creating competing software products through an abusive licensing agreement. Since
Lasercomb, the doctrine of copyright misuse has been successfully applied by other
courts.59 In particular, the Ninth and the Fifth Circuits have recognized this doctrine as a
valid affirmative defense against claims of copyright infringement. 6 0 Generally, courts
have found copyright misuse primarily in two instances: (1) when a copyright holder uses
rights granted under the Copyright Act in a manner that violates federal antitrust law or in

" See id.
54

See discussion supra Part II.

Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 04-05443 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011).
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
See id. at 492 (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. § 8). See also 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS, § 19:04 (2003).
58 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
59 Generally, for a detailed reconstruction of the development of the judicial doctrine of copyright
misuse, see Kathryn Judge, Rethinking CopyrightMisuse, 57 STAN. L. REv. 901 (2004).
60 See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v.
Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Assessment Tech. of WI, L.L.C. v. Wiredata, Inc.,
350 F.3d 640, 646-47 (7th Cir. 2003) (warning that if AT would "[tiry by contract or otherwise to prevent
the municipalities from revealing their own data, especially when ... the complete data are unavailable
anywhere else, might constitute copyright misuse.").
5s

56
57
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a deliberately anti-competitive manner, 6 1 and (2) when copyright holders attempt to
extend their copyright beyond the scope of the exclusive rights granted by Congress in a
manner that violates the public policy embodied in copyright law, including by
"leveraging their limited monopoly to allow them to control areas outside their
monopoly." 62
Under these parameters, the doctrine of copyright misuse can certainly be applied
with respect to the practice of leveraging copyright protection for incidental product
features to restrict redistribution of products in their entirety. Undoubtedly, this practice
directly conflicts with the prohibition written into copyright law to protect functional
devices (which are generally protected under patent law). Similarly, this practice also
conflicts with trademark law's procompetitive policy of allowing the resale of lawfully
purchased consumer goods. 63 Courts in the United States have repeatedly held that "the
right of a producer to control distribution of its trademarked product does not extend
beyond the first sale of the product." 64 This rule was designed to benefit the public once
trademark owners realized the commercial value of their marks with the first sale of their
goods in the market, regardless of whether the first sale took place within or outside the
United States. In addition to the courts, Congress and the Customs Services recognize
this position and have enacted provisions that allow the resale of trademarked goods after
their first sale. 65 Accordingly, attempts to circumvent these rules and, ultimately, the
underlying policy objectives of these rules directly amounts to "leveraging [the] limited
[copyright] monopoly to allow [businesses] to control areas outside their monopoly." 66
Thus, courts should clearly define and prohibit these attempts as copyright misuse.
To the contrary, should the judiciary continue to avoid entering the debate,
intellectual property owners will continue to exploit copyright protection for incidental
aspects of otherwise functional products, which could result in dire consequences for
market competition. Undoubtedly, some occasional overlaps in the exercise of
intellectual property rights are unavoidable in the business world. However, such a
recurring and systematic exploitation of the differences in the first sale rules in copyright
and trademark law should be prohibited, as this practice goes explicitly against the
traditional balance between the interests of intellectual property owners and the public
interest. In particular, courts should deny copyright protection to businesses claiming
protection for incidental features of their products, as this practice creates a system that
inequitably favors intellectual property owners over the public. Intellectual property
owners are overprotected by a dual copyright and trademark protection in the same
product. As a result, they are overcompensated with a double reward with respect to
them, whereas the public needs to pay a double price to intellectual property owners for
acquiring and using these products. Should the courts not address this conflict,
corporations will continue to invoke copyright protection for labels, logos, and other
insignias, even though these product features are far from constituting works promoting
See Judge, supranote 60, at 903 n.4 (quoting In Re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp.2d
1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2002) as the case providing "one of the most thorough summaries available of the
doctrine's
history and current status").
62
61

1d.

at 904.

See discussion supraPart II.
64 Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d
1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995).
65 See discussion supra
Part II.
66 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121
F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
63
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"the progress of ... arts by securing for limited times to authors ... the exclusive right to

their respective writings", to which the Constitution refers to lay out the justification of
copyright protection. 67 Ultimately, copyright law will become (or simply continue to be)
a tool for corporations to promote their business models and marketing strategies-areas
that have traditionally been regulated under the rule of trademark law and unfair
competition law.68 Most relevant, corporations will continue to segment international
markets with impunity to the detriment of consumers.
*116
This situation is not what Congress envisioned when it enacted the Copyright Act
and other intellectual property legislation. Attempts to exploit overlapping protections
are quite common in the business world, but eventually these business stratagems will not
survive the scrutiny of the courts. Already, in 1880 in Baker v. Selden, 69 the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that copyright protection could apply to functional systems
which could be protected, instead, by patents. More recently, in 1989 in Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc.70 and again in 2001 in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc.,7 1 the Court repeated the position that unpatented useful items (or useful
items for which a patent has expired) cannot and should not be further protected under
the rule of trademark or copyright law. In 2003, the Supreme Court also began to tackle
the issue of overlapping copyright and trademark protection and urged courts to police
the boundaries between copyright and trademark law in order to prevent the misuse and
overextension of intellectual property rights. 72 Although this case did not address the
issue of copyright misuse, the Court clearly opposed the opportunistic gaming of
copyright and trademark protection to satisfy private corporate interests against the public
policy objectives pursued by different intellectual property rights. 73 Following this line
of reasoning, courts (and possibly Congress) should resolve the problems that
overlapping copyright and trademark protection may cause in the context of international
trade and gray market goods. Courts should explicitly prohibit as copyright misuse the
practice of leveraging copyright protection for incidental product features to block gray
market goods. The Supreme Court (and possibly Congress) should also clarify, once and
for all, the interpretation of sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a) of the Copyright Act and the
territorial extent-national or international-of the rule of copyright first sale.
IV. WAITING FOR ANSWERS: COULD THE DECISIONS IN KIRTSAEATG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS
AND OMEGA V. COSTCO (II) CALL THE CORPORATE GAME OVER?
V

?As
I have indicated in Part III, judicial guidance on the relationship between the
enforcement of intellectual property rights and international trade could soon be provided
by the Supreme Court's decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 74 and the Ninth's
U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See generally Christopher A. Mohr, Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law: An End Run Around
KMart v. Cartier,45 CATH. U. L. REV. 561 (1996) (describing the possibility to circumvent the holding in
KMart with copyright law).
69 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880).
70
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989).
71 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23 (2001).
72
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
Id. at 34.
74 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. 2012).
67
68
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Circuit decision in Omega v. Costco Wholesale. In Kirtsaeng,the Court is set to address
the interpretation of section 109(a) of the Copyright Act and the issue of the geographical
extent of the rule of copyright first sale. In Omega, the Ninth Circuit has the opportunity
to assess whether Omega's leveraging of copyright protection for a small insignia affixed
to the back of its watches to block the importation of unauthorized watches into the
United States constitutes copyright misuse. The outcomes of these cases could finally
resolve the uncertainty and confusion that currently characterize this area. Such judicial
guidance could also be coupled with appropriate legislative action by Congress. Notably,
Congress could introduce into the Copyright Act a specific provision rendering copyright
protection for incidental product features unenforceable in the context of international
trade and gray market products.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng following the Second Circuit's
decision in favor of John Wiley & Sons. 76 Dr. Kirtsaeng petitioned the Court and again
asked to clarify the application of section 109(a) of the Copyright Act to foreign
manufactured products-the issue that the Court had left unresolved with its non-decision
in Costco v. Omega in 2010. The Second Circuit's decision in Kirtsaeng was
considerably problematic because it relied on Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Quality
King and interpreted the language "lawfully made under this title" in section 109(a) as
"lawfully made in the United States."77 In particular, the Second Circuit departed from
the position by the Ninth Circuit that section 109(a) applies to foreign manufactured
products after their first lawful sale in the United States. Instead, the Second Circuit
stated that "[w]hile perhaps a close call . . . in light of its necessary interplay with section

HE

602(a)(1), section 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to works manufactured
domestically." 79 Under this ruling, only domestically manufactured products would then
be subject to the first sale rule, while section 109(a) would not apply to foreign-made
products, even after their authorized sale in the United States.80 This position was (and
still is) clearly problematic as it implied that the owners of copyrighted goods
manufactured abroad could prevent retailers, consumers, and even libraries and
museums, to resell, lend, or gift these goods even after the goods have been lawfully sold
in the United States.
In October 2012, the Court heard the oral arguments in the case.81 The Justices
struggled in reconciling the outcome of the decision in Quality King with the intention of
the legislature in enacting section 109(a) of the Copyright Act. Notably, the Justices
underlined that Congress could not have intended a ("horrible") system wherein foreign

Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. July 25, 2012).
Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011).
7 The Second Circuit directly relied on Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Quality King v. L'anza
ResearchInt'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998). (Ginsburg J., concurring) (holding that the first sale doctrine
does not apply to copies manufactured outside of the United States.).
78 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v.
Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991).
79
John Wiley & Sons, 654 F.3d at 221 (noting that the Ninth Circuit held that section 109 applies also to
foreign manufactured works sold in the US).
80
Id.
81 Transcript of Oral Argument, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012) (No. 11697), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/ 11-697.pdf.
7
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manufactured goods would not be subject to the principle of copyright first sale.8 2 Still,
the Justices also showed reasonable concerns for the impact that a broader interpretation
of section 109(a)--a shift toward a system of international first sale in copyright lawcould have on domestic businesses and their ability to price products differently across
different jurisdictions. 83 Ultimately, the outcome of the Court's decision in Kirtsaeng
could follow one of three solutions. First, the Court could reverse and agree with
petitioner's argument that the language "lawfully made under this title" should not be
interpreted as "lawfully made in the United States" but instead as "lawfully made
anywhere in the world." This outcome would end the corporate game of exploiting and
leveraging copyright protection for incidental features of uncopyrightable products to
block gray market products. Corporations' ability to engage in this practice would end
when both copyright and trademark law follow the same rule of international first sale.
Second, the Court could agree, instead, with the position so far supported by the Ninth
Circuit that section 109(a) and the first sale rule apply to copyrighted products (regardless
of their place of manufacture) only after their lawful sale in the United States. 84 Third,
the Court could affirm the Second Circuit and rule that section 109(a) indeed applies only
to domestically manufactured products.
In either of these two latter hypotheses,
corporations' ability to leverage copyright protection for incidental features of their
products to circumvent the rule of international trademark first sale would continuewith respect to all unauthorized imports if the Court adopts an approach similar to the
Ninth Circuit's or with respect to the unauthorized importation of goods manufactured
abroad if the Court affirms the Second Circuit.
Because of the uncertain outcome in Kirtsaeng, it is fundamental that the Ninth
Circuit affirms the decision of the California District Court in the case Omega v.
Costco,86 on remand after the Supreme Court case in 2010, Costco v. Omega, and rules
that Omega misused its copyright protection in the Omega Globe Design. Even though
the Ninth Circuit previously found in favor of Omega,8 7 the Ninth Circuit has already
embraced a broader interpretation of copyright misuse in other decisions.8 8 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit could, and should affirn the District Court in this case. Omega itself
conceded "a purpose of the copyrighted Omega Globe Design was to control the
importation and sale of its watches containing the design, as the watches could not be
copyrighted." 89 In turn, the District Court found that "Omega misused its copyright of
the Omega Globe Design by leveraging its limited monopoly in being able to control the

Id. at 29-32.
Id. at 32.
84
See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008); L'anza Research Int'l,
Inc. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996).
John Wiley & Sons, 654 F.3d at 210; see also Pearson Educ., Inc. v Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding dubitante in a case also dealing with imported textbooks, that the first sale rule
82
83

does not apply to foreign manufactured goods).
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 11-57137 (9th Cir. July 25, 2012).
Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (in this decision the court
addressed only the territorial extent of Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act and did not address the issue of
copyright misuse). This decision was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v
Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
88 See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1997).
89 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 04-05443, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2011).
86
87
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importation of that design to control the importation of its ... watches." 90 Traditionally,
courts limited the defense of copyright misuse primarily to "situations involving antitrust
tying agreements and restrictive licensing agreements," 9' yet the District Court supported
the position that these precedents would not exclude "that copyright misuse could exist in
other situations," like in the situation at issue.92 Omega, the District Court said, "used the
defensive shield of copyright law as an offensive sword,"9 3 and as such misused its
copyright in the Omega Globe Design. Ultimately, the public policy underlying copyright
law and the subsequent application of the copyright misuse doctrine clearly weigh in
favor of a ruling in Costco's favor in this case. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should
affirm the District Court's finding that Omega was leveraging and misusing its copyrights
in the Omega Globe Design-a minuscule (irrelevant) insignia affixed to the back on its
watches-exclusively to prevent the legitimate importation of otherwise functional and
uncopyrightable watches.
1I
In addition to the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit (or other Courts of
Appeals), Congress could also step into the debate and enact ad hoc legislation in this
area. Similar to countries like Australia 94 and Singapore, 95 Congress could enact as part
of the Copyright Act a provision stating "the importation or sale of an article does not
infringe the copyright embodied in elements that are merely 'accessory' to the article."
As under Australia's and Singapore's Copyright Acts, Congress could include in the
definition of "accessory," items such as: labels incorporated into the surface of an article;
packaging or containers in which an article is packaged or contained; labels affixed to,
displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, the packaging or

container in which the article is packaged or contained; written instructions, warranties or
90

Id at 3.

91 Id.
92 Id.

93 Id. at 2.
94 CopyrightAct 1968 (Cth) s 10(1), 10(d), 44C, and 112 (Austl.). The original text of the Australian
Copyright Act was amended in 1998, 2000, and 2001. With respect to the subject matter of this Essay, see
Schedule 3, Copyright Amendment Bill 1997 (Cth) (Austi.), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/BillsLegislation/bd/BD9697/97bd160#Passage."[I]f the
label or instructional material has already been approved by the manufacturer as an accessory to the
product (say, for use in another country), then the importation into Australia of the product itself should not
be stopped. The issue is that the force of copyright law was never meant to apply to the contents of the
bottle of liqueur which is really the subject of the importation." Id.For an overview of the motivations that
brought to the adoption of this legislative amendment, see also R. & A. Bailey & Co. Ltd v. Boccaccio Pty
Ltd [1986] 4 NSWLR 701 (Austl.) (decided before the 1998 Copyright Amendment Act). For ajudicial
application of the new provision, see Polo/Lauren Company L.P. v. Ziliani Holdings Pty Ltd [2008]
FCAFC 195 (decided after the 1998 Copyright Amendment Act) (Austl.). I would like to particularly thank
Professor Mary LaFrance for indicating to me the relevance of the Australian legal system and the two
above mentioned Australian cases with respect to the national debate on the same issue in the United
States. Professor LaFrance has developed, for the first time among United States scholars, a specific
proposal advocating an amendment to the Copyright Act to include a similar statutory limitation also in the
United States. See Mary LaFrance, Avoiding Mutant Trademarks:A Statutory Exclusionfor Copyrighted

Accessories to ParallelImports, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (forthcoming 2013-14) (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds.) (on file with author); Mary
LaFrance, Wag the Dog: Using IncidentalIntellectualPropertyRights to Block ParallelImports, (article
draft) (on file with author).
95 Singapore Copyright Act of 1987, §§ 7(1), 40A(1) (2006) (Sing.) (as amended by Copyright
Amendment Act No. 14 of 1994). It should be noted that Singapore follows a rule of international first sale
both in copyright and trademark law, thus Singapore courts have not addressed to date any attempt by
corporations to leverage copyright protection to circumvent the rule of trademark law.
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other information provided with the article. 9 6 This legislative amendment would not
conflict with any of the possible interpretations of sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a) that the
Supreme Court could adopt in Kirtsaeng, such as if section 109(a) should be read as
establishing a rule of international or rather national first sale. The amendment, instead,
would assist the judiciary both in the short and long term by creating a specific
prohibition against the leveraging of copyright protection for "accessory" features
regardless of the territorial extent-national or international-of the rule on copyright
first sale in the United States. Most crucial, such an amendment would render
unenforceable copyright protection for incidental elements of functional products even in
those cases where the courts might still be hesitant in defining this practice as copyright
misuse. As expected, the corporate world is already lobbying to overrule a possible
outcome of Kirtsaeng in favor of international copyright first sale, and is calling for new
legislation that would clearly (re)instate a system of national first sale. 9 7 In light of these
efforts, an ad hoc amendment prohibiting copyright protection for incidental product
features in the context of international trade seems to be necessary in order to prevent the
opportunist exploitation of overlapping copyright and trademark protection on otherwise
uncopyrightable products.

Section 10(1) of the Australia Copyright Act defines as "accessory" the followings: "(a) a label
affixed to, displayed on, incorporated into the surface of, or accompanying, the article; (b) the packaging or
container in which the article is packaged or contained; (c) a label affixed to, displayed on, incorporated
into the surface of, or accompanying, the packaging or container in which the article is packaged or
contained; (d) a written instruction, warranty or other information provided with the article; (e) a record
embodying an instructional sound recording, or a copy of an instructional cinematograph film, provided
with the article." Id. Section 7(1) of the Singapore Copyright Act provides a similar list of items to be
considered "accessory." Id.
97 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft Agreement, U.S.-Austl.,
Feb. 2011, availableat http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-1Ofeb201 I-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf
96

[hereinafter TPP, February2011 IP ChapterDraft]; see also Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual

Property Rights Chapter, Draft (Selected Provisions), U.S.-Austl., Sept. 2011, availableat
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/20 11/10/TransPacificIPI.pdf. [hereinafter TPP-2].
The TPP is currently being negotiated between Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States. In particular, Article 4.2 of the TPP IP Chapter
Draft states that "[e]ach Party shall provide to authors, performers, and producers of phonograms the right
to authorize or prohibit the importation into that Party's territory of copies of the work, performance, or
phonogram made without authorization, or made outside that Party's territory with the authorization of the
author, performer, or producer of the phonogram." TPP, February2011 IP ChapterDraft, art. 4.2.
Interestingly, in line with a possible legislative amendment prohibiting leveraging copyright protection for
"accessory" product features in the context of international trade, footnote 11 to the proposed text of Article
4.2, specifies that "[w]ith respect to copies of works and phonograms that have been placed on the market
by the relevant right holder, the obligations described in Article [4.2] apply only to books, journals, sheet
music, sound recordings, computer programs, and audio and visual works (i.e., categories of products in
which the value of the copyrighted material represents substantially all of the value of the product)." TPP,
February2011 IP ChapterDraft, art. 4.2, n. 11. However, the last part of footnote 11 concludes with the
language, "[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, each Party may provide the protection described in Article
[4.2] to a broader range of goods." Id. This language could be interpreted as permitting copyright protection
for a range of goods where the copyrighted materials do not represent "substantially all the value of the
product[s]" Id. This in turn could be interpreted as permitting copyright protection for incidental product
features for those members of the TPP that would favor this approach, thus overruling a possible decision
in favor of Costco and copyright misuse in Omega SA v. Costco Wholesale Corp. by the Ninth Circuit.
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V. CONCLUSION
The opportunistic exploitation of one type of intellectual property right to expand
other types of rights is not an uncommon phenomenon in the business world. Once a
specific overlapping practice is brought to the attention of the courts, they have generally
redressed the imbalances that result from this exploitation by prohibiting or limiting
overlapping rights. Accordingly, United States courts should prohibit the current practice
of claiming copyright protection for incidental (often insignificant) product features of
otherwise functional and uncopyrightable products and leveraging this protection in order
to control the distribution of these products in the international market. To this end,
courts should boldly and consistently embrace the position that this practice amounts to
copyright misuse insofar as it permits copyright owners to use "copyright in a manner
that violates the public policy embodied in the grant of the copyright."' 9 Notably, the
Ninth Circuit should affirm the District Court in the appeal currently pending in Omega
v. Costco, and should confirm that Omega's copyrighted insignia, as well as Omega's
attempt to segment the market by leveraging copyright on that insignia constitute
copyright misuses.
A decision by the Ninth Circuit confirming that Omega misused copyright law
would prove crucial, especially if the Supreme Court confirms a system of national
copyright first sale in Kirtsaeng.A decision in Kirtsaeng in favor of national copyright
first sale would in fact perpetuate the difference in the first sale rules between copyright
and trademark law in the United States. This distinction would leave intact the incentive
for corporations to obtain and leverage copyright protection in the context of international
trade of consumer products. Still, the Ninth Circuit should find in favor of Costco and
find that Omega misused copyright law regardless of the outcome of the decision in
Kirtsaeng including the case where the Supreme Court would reverse the decision on
appeal and rule in favor of a rule of international copyright first sale. In particular, courts
in the United States should take the fundamental step of defining as copyright misuse the
practice of leveraging copyright protection for incidental product features to segment
international markets. The Ninth Circuit currently has the opportunity to mark this step.
Ideally, Congress could follow the example of other jurisdictions by enacting ad hoc
legislation that would explicitly prohibit, or render unenforceable, copyright protection
for incidental features of otherwise uncopyrightable products, once and for all. Such
legislative amendment seems increasingly necessary considering the corporate world is
already lobbying to overrule a possible outcome of Kirtsaeng in favor of international
copyright first sale.
Until the day Congress acts, the responsibility nevertheless remains with the
judiciary to safeguard the public policy objectives that are at the core of intellectual
property rights, in this case, the respective and distinct domain of copyright and
trademark law. These objectives have never included the creation of a system where
corporations could invoke copyright protection for the labels, warranties, instructions,
packaging design, or insignias affixed onto hidden parts of their products rather than for
actual works of authorship. In such a system, corporations derive most, or all of the
benefits of copyright protection, and multiple rewards for the sale of the same products.
Meanwhile, the public covers all the costs of this protection and is deprived of the benefit
98 PracticeMgmt., 121 F.3d at 521.
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resulting from the sales of genuine gray market products. Courts in the United States,
beginning with the Ninth Circuit in Omega v. Costco, should now redress this growing
imbalance. Courts should finally call the corporate game of misusing copyright law to
protect incidental, often insignificant product features over.
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